if there’s one lesson i’ve learned from my 3-year-and-counting entrepreneurial stint in india, it’s that market size matters. vcs love it more than their mistresses, businesses cannot even begin to contemplate revenues without it, and frankly, even shitty ideas have half a shot if the market is juicy enough. many of my vc buddies (i know, you’re surprised i have vc buddies) have told me personally that they come across some smart teams with good ideas…but in the wrong market, namely, india. many of them have even admitted to me that when they were fundraising, one of the things that was a slightly easier sell to the lps was that india was a country with a population of over 1 billion people. lps were sold the lip-smacking dream of over 1 billion potential customers for the right ideas. this is where india diverges a bit from many other countries that are currently cultivating some great startup ideas. why is india different? my theory is simply this: the delta (or difference) between what many consider to be india’s market size and its addressable market size is vast.
i see this fallacy most starkly when discussing mobile opportunities or mobile businesses in india. again, i go back to discussions with vc buds to establish some context. many have now retreated back to their shells and are not actively and excitingly deploying their funds; or they’ve taken their fund deployment strategy upstream, and have essentially become more private-equity’ish in investment philosophy (less risk). the addressable market size reality has been a rude awakening; but most do still have mandates to invest early stage in mobile. the mobile market in india is closing in on just below half a billion. that’s almost twice the entire population of the united states. how many of those mobile subscribers are on prepaid plans? how many of them are below the poverty line? how many of them are unemployed? qualitatively, how many of them are just struggling to get a 4th grade education, can’t afford medicine for their illnesses, and frankly, don’t give a shit about anything except making sure their mobile allows them to talk to their circle? the point i’m trying to make is that when we sit down and try to draft up our fancy business plans, our best estimates of the addressable market size are, in actuality, just some bullshit pipe dream. the fact is none of us really know. there are stark quantitative and more importantly (and less measurable) qualitative realities in india that choke our efforts to understand who might actually use the shit we’re trying to sell to them.
i often tell anand that our next thing must target a more predictable and larger addressable market. we’ve been lucky thus far. but sometimes, you just have to put yourself in a position to get lucky. sorry, my entrepreneurial peers; india is not that place.
e if our brains forge ahead. first things first: let’s all understand full well that the united states is a credit-based economy (as opposed to a cash-based economy). people buy everything using the diabolical plastic rectangle. so, now that we’ve set up the story, here’s the rundown: interest rates were deliciously low, making it cheaper for people to borrow money, even those that shouldn’t have been borrowing money. banks sensed an opportunity to ensnare the arithmetically challenged and extended loans to anyone, in exchange for stiffer, more predatory terms. these loans had a honeymoon period, which, when over, would completely screw the borrower. these subprime loans were then bundled neatly into securities, or rather a portfolio of shi*ty loans, and then sold to secondary and tertiary markets. for some reason, someone thought that lumping all these sh*t loans together would actually make them more valuable. smart. then, the perfect storm. the housing market in the us starts to spiral downwards, while honeymoon loan terms come to a close. mr. borrower can’t make his payment, so the bank takes over a house worth half of what it was 6 months ago. simultaneously, since so many large banks had taken large positions in these securitized subprime mortgages, all of a sudden, there is no return on their capital. and banks are in the business of moving capital. oh oh, sh*t hits the fan, all hell breaks loose, and the gov’t is reduced to socializing the losses of these rich, fat bastard ceos who were irresponsibly hording crappy loan portfolios in hopes of achieving much higher returns. phew. don’t skewer my balls for oversimplification. there are many nuances not discussed here, such as the theory that aggressive short-selling by large hedge funds may have been a suspect correlative to the current sky-is-falling atmosphere around the world. my intentions were not to educate you on the ‘economic crisis’, rather, it was to introspect and determine whether any courses of action could help younger, cash-strapped entrepreneurs in india.
them understand what would make mobile internet tip in india, i.e. what localization features, both physical and at the application level, would make sense for indians? see, nokia is now positioning themselves not as a handset manufacturer, but as an internet company that focuses on products and services. with their insane mobile device market share in india, they’re really feeling the pressure to crack this nut. a small group of smart startup dudes, each representing their own space, made solid cases for applications that could help tip the market – everything from data collection apps, to spatial traffic updates and governance apps, to local listings information and of course, mobile social networking. i then took a shot at elevating the conversation to a more macro level – what is mobile internet? what does mobile internet mean for indians? more importantly, what does mobile internet mean on an entry level phone vs. an e-series or an n-series nokia?

